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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
 
 
INFERENCE GENERATION AND STORY COMPREHENSION AMONG 
CHILDREN WITH ADHD 
 
Academic difficulties are well-documented among children with ADHD.  Exploring 
these difficulties through story comprehension research has revealed deficits among 
children with ADHD in making causal connections between events, and using causal 
structure and thematic importance when recalling stories.  Important to theories of story 
comprehension and implied in these deficits is the ability to make inferences.  Often, 
characters’ goals are implicit and explanations of events must be inferred.  The purpose 
of the present study was to compare the ability of 7- to 11-year-old children with ADHD 
and their comparison peers to make inferences during story comprehension.  Children 
watched two televised stories, each paused at five points.  In the experimental condition, 
at each pause children told what they were thinking about the story, whereas in the 
control condition no responses were made during pauses.  After viewing, children 
recalled the story.  Several types of inferences and accuracy of inferences were coded.  
Children with ADHD generated fewer of the most essential inferences, accurate 
coherence inferences, than did comparison children, both during story processing and 
during story recall.  The groups did not differ on production of other types of inferences.  
Generating fewer coherence inferences has important implications for story 
comprehension deficits in children with ADHD. 
 
Keywords: Inferences, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Think-aloud, Story 
Comprehension, Academic Achievement. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) often have 
academic difficulties that cause them to fall behind their peers.  The problems that 
contribute to these academic difficulties are not purely behavioral (i.e., elevated levels of 
impulsivity, hyperactivity, and inattention) but also include higher order cognitive 
deficits (Barkley, 2006).  Investigating the cognitive deficits that affect academic 
performance can lead researchers to be able to assist children with ADHD academically 
by creating interventions tailored specifically to address these problems.  To this end, 
story comprehension tasks provide a promising direction for examining higher-order 
cognitive difficulties that may lead to academic problems for these children.  Story 
comprehension research can provide us the vital clues needed to understand and 
potentially help these children academically. 
According to the Diagnostic and Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-
TR: American Psychiatric Association, 2000), ADHD consists of problems in 
hyperactivity, impulsivity, and inattention.  Every child displays such behaviors from 
time to time, but children with ADHD exhibit them to such a degree that they interfere 
with their ability to function normally in multiple environments.  In the United States 
estimates of prevalence range from 2-10% of the population; an estimated 5% of school 
age children have the disorder (Barkley, 2006). 
The vast majority of children with ADHD struggle academically in several areas, 
including reading and math.  These and other problems in the classroom are a common 
reason for treatment referral.  These academic difficulties lead to a greater need for 
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tutoring, higher levels of repeating grades at least once, and higher suspension and 
dropout rates for children with ADHD in comparison to their peers (Barkley, 2006).  
Early interventions are ideal for preventing further academic failure.  However, common 
treatments for young children: psychotropic medications, behavior modification, and 
parent training, while reducing behavioral symptoms, do not address the higher-order 
cognitive deficits still experienced by children with ADHD, as evidenced by problems in 
story narrations that are unaffected by medication (Bailey, Derefinko, Milich, Lorch, & 
Metze, 2011; Derefinko, Bailey, Lorch, & Milich, 2009). 
Studying these academic problems through the lens of story comprehension has 
proven to be a useful methodology for investigating higher order cognitive skills of 
children with ADHD (Lorch, Berthiaume, Milich, & van den Broek, 2007).  Some of the 
higher order cognitive skills required to understand stories include sustaining attention, 
monitoring comprehension, following causal structure, differentiating between important 
and unimportant information, and remembering and recalling important information.  By 
investigating the story comprehension of children with ADHD and comparison children, 
researchers have identified narrative comprehension deficits specifically associated with 
ADHD that may be contributing to academic problems for these children.  Among these 
deficits are problems using the causal structure of a story to aid comprehension, gaps in 
sustaining attention to information about characters’ goals, and difficulties recognizing 
important information (Lorch, et al., 2007; Lorch, Sanchez, et al., 1999; Lorch, Eastham, 
et al., 2004; Lorch, O’Neil, et al., 2004; Renz et al., 2003).  These deficits may be related 
to difficulties with an important aspect of story comprehension that has not been so 
thoroughly investigated: the ability to make inferences.  The inference-making abilities of 
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children with ADHD in comparison to same-age peers will be the focus of the current 
study. 
One of the areas of story comprehension that poses significant difficulties for 
children with ADHD is the detection of causal relations and causal structure.  According 
to the Causal Network Model (Trabasso & van den Broek, 1985; Trabasso, van den 
Broek, & Suh, 1989), the causes and consequences of story events form the foundation of 
story structure.  An event within a story, if it is important to the story line, will usually 
have preceding events that cause it to occur and consequences that will motivate future 
events, thus creating a network of interrelated events (Lorch, et al., 2007; van den Broek, 
1989).  The causal relationships between these interrelated events are termed causal 
connections. 
The Causal Network Model suggests that the greater the number of causal 
connections an event has to other events, the greater the importance of that event in 
maintaining a coherent story representation (van den Broek, 1989).  Events with many 
causal connections are often important to the story, and the likelihood that an event will 
be recalled increases with number of causal connections (Trabasso & van den Broek, 
1985).  This is true for adults as well as for children (van den Broek, 1989), illustrating 
the significance of causal connections to stories. 
An early study by Tannock, Purvis, and Schachar (1993) showed that children 
with ADHD have problems with basic story comprehension.  These children retold 
shorter stories with less organization, less structure, and more errors than their 
comparison peers.  More recent lines of research suggest that these children exhibit a 
deficit in understanding causal connections relative to comparison peers under various 
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story conditions.  When children listened to and subsequently retold an audiotaped story 
(Lorch, Deiner, et al., 1999) or a televised story (Lorch, Sanchez, et al., 1999), children 
with ADHD did not make use of causal structure and number of causal connections 
(Lorch, Deiner, et al., 1999; Lorch, Sanchez, et al., 1999) in the recall of stories to the 
same extent as their typically developing peers.  Although both diagnostic groups 
recalled more information on the causal chain (a series of causally connected events that 
form a story line), this effect was weaker for children with ADHD (Lorch, Deiner, et al., 
1999; Lorch, Sanchez, et al., 1999).  After viewing a televised story, children with 
ADHD often perform more poorly on questions testing causal relations than do 
comparison children, a difference that may be related to less sustained cognitive 
engagement with the televised story (Lorch, Eastham et al., 2004). 
As suggested above, events that have the most causal connections to other events 
should also be the most important events in the story (van den Broek, 1989), because 
without these events the story would not be coherent.  It is not surprising, then, that 
deficits in the detection of causal connections exhibited by children with ADHD are also 
related to documented problems with recalling or explicitly identifying events rated to be 
important by skilled adult comprehenders (Flake, Lorch, & Milich, 2007).  Children with 
ADHD do not utilize event importance to guide recall as well as comparison children.  
Both children with ADHD and comparison peers exhibit enhanced recall of an event as a 
function of its importance, but comparison children show a stronger increase in recall for 
higher levels of importance than children with ADHD (Flake, et al., 2007; Lorch, Diener, 
et al., 1999; Lorch, O’Neil, et al., 2004)  
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Two studies have investigated the developmental implications of these story 
comprehension deficits of children with ADHD.  Bailey, Lorch, Milich, and Charnigo 
(2009) and Lorch, Milich, Flake, Ohlendorf, and Little (2010) both studied children with 
ADHD and their peers at two points in time separated by 21 months.  At the first time 
point, children with ADHD demonstrated deficits in understanding causal relations 
(Bailey et al., 2009), in free recall as a function of the importance of events, and in the 
coherence of story recalls (Lorch et al., 2010).  After 21 months, there was no evidence 
that gaps in performance had been reduced.  In fact, group differences in understanding 
causal relations (Bailey et al., 2009) and in producing coherent recalls (Lorch et al., 2010) 
increased over time.  
Inferences 
Inference generation is an important aspect of story comprehension that has been 
given little attention in the study of story comprehension deficits exhibited by children 
with ADHD.  An inference is an event or conclusion reached based on information 
contained in a text or story, but not stated explicitly (Trabasso & Magliano, 1996).  
Making inferences is as central to story comprehension as understanding causal 
relationships and recognizing importance of story events (van den Broek, et al., 2005; van 
den Broek, 1989; van Kleeck, 2008).  While reading or listening to a story, the 
comprehender often must infer information that is not explicitly stated, including 
inferring causal connections among events.  Inferences often are made so automatically 
that skilled readers do not realize that they are creating them.  However, if readers did not 
create inferences, many stories would be incomprehensible (Thurlow & van den Broek, 
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1997) and could seem like series of disconnected events.  For example, in a story titled 
The Brave Knight, there is a passage that reads: 
He gathered his sword and shield and went off to challenge the dragon.  The 
Knight began to climb the Dragon’s mountain, but just as he got close to the top, 
it started to rain.  “Rain can’t hurt me,” said the Knight.  But then he realized it 
was getting hard to move his arms and legs.  He looked down and saw that his suit 
of armor had begun to rust!  So he took off his armor and dropped it on the side of 
the mountain. 
In order for listeners to comprehend this passage fully, they must infer that the 
rain caused the knight’s armor to rust.  In this example, failure to infer that rain caused 
the armor to rust would lead to an incomplete understanding of the story events (Thurlow 
& van den Broek, 1997). 
 Researchers have defined inferences in several different ways (Graesser, 
Swamer, Baggett, & Sell, 1996; Kendeou, Bohn-Gettler, White, & van den Broek, 2008; 
Thurlow & van den Broek, 1997; Trabasso & Magliano, 1996).  Two major categories of 
inferences identified by Thurlow and van den Broek (1997), coherence inferences and 
elaborative inferences, are most relevant to the current study.  Coherence inferences are 
essential inferences that must be made in order for the story to be comprehensible.  A 
critical type of coherence inference is a causal inference.  A causal inference is one that 
connects two or more story events as causes or consequences of one another, without the 
connection being explicitly stated or explained in the story.  Inferring such cause and 
effect sequences enables the construction of coherent story representations.   
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The other main category of inference is the elaborative inference.  This category 
adds additional information to the story, but unlike the coherence inference, is not 
essential to story comprehension.  Thus, these inferences do not have to be created in 
order to continue to understand what is occurring in the story.  This category includes two 
specific types of inferences: likely and enriching.  Likely inferences, according to 
Thurlow and van den Broek (1997), are inferences that are reasonable to make in the 
context of story events but do not have to occur in the same way for every individual.  
For instance, different people could have different impressions of how long the knight in 
the above example was walking in the rain before he started to have trouble moving, or 
have different ideas of how large the mountain was.  Such inferences are part of a 
coherent understanding of the story but inference differences between individuals will not 
affect the storyline.  Enriching inferences simply add details that color or ‘enrich’ the 
passage.  Was the dragon angry or frightened, was the knight annoyed when he lost his 
armor, did the hole the knight fell into exist naturally or was it made by the dragon or 
people? Readers do not have to ask such questions, but may make enrichment inferences 
in order to answer them.  Elaborative inferences are not created as often as are coherence 
inferences because they are not essential to understanding stories (Long, Oppy, & Seely, 
1994; Thurlow & van den Broek, 1997).  Among other factors, the likelihood of making 
elaborative inferences is influenced by how much cognitive load the comprehender is 
experiencing and whether they have enough mental capacity to think about additional 
details (Thurlow & van den Broek, 1997). 
A major subcategory of elaborative inference that the current study investigated 
separately is the forward, or predictive, inference.  These inferences occur when the 
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comprehender makes some guess concerning future events based on previous events.  In 
the example given above, the reader could predict either that the knight continues on his 
quest to defeat the dragon, or that he will give up after his armor has rusted.  These 
predictive inferences do not need to be created in order to maintain a coherent story 
representation; therefore they are categorized as elaborative inferences.  However, 
because of the potential relations of predictive inferences to the creation of causal 
connections, predictive inferences were coded as a distinct category.   
Inference making is a major part of adults’ story comprehension.  When adults 
were asked to think aloud about a story, most of their statements were inferences 
(McGinnis, Goss, Tessmer, & Zelinski, 2008; Trabasso & Magliano, 1996).  Trabasso 
and Magliano (1996) found that adults create causal inferences (also known as coherence 
inferences) more than other types of inferences.  They found that children create more 
causal inferences relative to other types as well.  This outcome indicates that causal 
inferences are vital to story comprehension for all age groups.   
Children begin to make inferences as early as four years of age (Kendeou et al., 
2008).  The total number of inferences made predicts children’s ability to recall a story 
(Lynch & van den Broek, 2001), suggesting that the ability to make inferences is vital to 
children’s story comprehension.  The inferences that children create become more 
numerous, more complex, and more accurate with age, thus more closely resembling 
adult inferences.  For example, children can make causal inferences by 6 years of age, 
and their more refined understanding of stories allows them to make more complex 
inferences such as character emotions and actions by 8 years of age (Kendeou et al., 
2008).  Additionally, while children as young as 6 years old make causal inferences that 
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are important for story coherence (i.e., inferences related to causal connections and story 
plotline), older children create a greater number of these inferences (Casteel, 1993; van 
den Broek, 1989; van den Broek, Tzeng, Risden, Trabasso & Basche, 2001).  Children 
who are poor story comprehenders make fewer inferences and create more inaccurate 
inferences than do skilled comprehenders.  Importantly, children who are poor 
comprehenders make fewer causal inferences than do skilled comprehenders, indicating a 
more tenuous understanding of causal relationships between events (Laing & Kamhi, 
2002).  Cain and Oakhill (1999) found that poor comprehenders also make fewer 
inferences that require the child to connect different parts of the text together or infer 
supplemental information not provided by the text (comparable to enriching inferences).  
These differences may be due to less skilled readers’ struggle with higher-order cognitive 
skills such as selectively attending to information necessary for story understanding (Cain 
& Oakhill, 1999: Cain, Oakhill, Barnes, & Bryant, 2001).   
Most previous studies reporting differences in inference generation between poor 
and skilled comprehenders required children to read passages of text.  Kendeou et al. 
(2008) investigated whether these documented differences in inference generation are 
based solely on reading skill, or if they are correlated across multiple types of media for 
4- to 6-year-olds.  In addition, they examined whether inference generation with various 
media types was predictive of story comprehension two years later.  All children in this 
study viewed a televised story and listened to an audiotaped story at each time point, and 
at the two-year follow-up, children also read a story.  Children then retold the stories and 
answered questions concerning the storyline.  At the first time point, inference generation 
was predictive of story comprehension abilities above and beyond vocabulary skills for 
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each age group.  The inference-making capabilities of the children at the first time point 
were also predictive of their comprehension skills when they were re-tested two years 
later.  In addition, Kendeou et al. found that the capability to make inferences correlated 
across all three types of media: audio, audio/visual, and reading.  Thus, inference abilities 
are not dependent upon media type, but rather are central to the story comprehension 
process no matter in what context the story is delivered.   
Methods of Assessing Inference Generation 
There are several different procedures that researchers have used in order to 
measure the types of inferences that children make.  One common method relevant to the 
current study is the think-aloud procedure, in which children are asked to vocalize their 
thoughts about a story at various pauses throughout the story.  This procedure allows 
researchers to probe for inferences on-line.  This is in contrast to an alternative method of 
asking children to recall the story after the story is finished (Cain, & Oakhill, 1999; Cain 
et al., 2001; Inman & Dickerson, 1995; Kendeou et al., 2008), a method that requires 
children to maintain inferences in working memory over the course of the story or to 
generate inferences during the recall.  Many researchers use the think-aloud procedure 
because it allows them to tap thinking processes, including inferences, as they occur 
(Laing & Kamhi, 2002; Lynch & van den Broek, 2007; McGinnis et al., 2008; van den 
Broek et al., 2001).  However, there have been reports that frequent pauses in a story 
procedure to ask questions may impair children’s comprehension (van den Broek et al., 
2001).   
Laing and Kamhi (2008) explored the think-aloud procedure and recall following 
a story for 8- to 9- year-old poor and average readers to determine what types of 
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inferences occurred during on-line story processing.  Children 8 to 9 years of age were 
divided into two groups: poor and average readers.  Each child either listened to an entire 
short story or were stopped after each sentence of a short story and asked to say what 
they understood about each story.  After the stories were finished, children were asked to 
retell the first of the stories they heard and answer literal and inferential questions for 
each story.  In their study, average readers created more inferences and fewer errors than 
poor comprehenders.  In addition, the think-aloud procedure aided both poor and average 
comprehenders in answering cued recall questions testing for inference making.  The 
think-aloud procedure should be used cautiously, however, because van den Broek et al., 
(2001) found that asking 4th grade children (approximately 10 years of age) questions 
every few sentences interfered with their story comprehension, perhaps by creating a 
cognitive overload.  Lynch and van den Broek (2007) asked 6-to-8-year-old children 
what they were thinking significantly less often during a story (approximately 10 
sentences between pauses) than did van den Broek et al. (2001).  This allowed more of 
the story to develop between each point.  Lynch and van den Broek found that the 
number of inferences generated significantly predicted recall of the story. 
Inferences and Children with ADHD 
 Whereas there have been multiple studies investigating inference generation for 
typically-developing children, inference-making abilities have not been adequately 
addressed with children with ADHD.  Given evidence that children with ADHD have 
difficulty effectively using story structure, causal connections, and importance of events, 
it is likely that these children would have problems drawing appropriate inferences from 
story events.  To date, there has been only one study addressing the inference-making 
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ability of children with ADHD.  Berthiaume, Lorch, and Milich (2010) investigated these 
children’s inference-making capabilities using two tasks.  In the first task, children were 
given between one and three clues about an ambiguous event or object, and then asked to 
guess (make an inference about) what the ambiguous word was based on those clues.  In 
the second task, a think-aloud task, the children listened to a passage which was 
approximately 13 sentences long.  After each sentence, the child was asked to say what 
they were thinking about the story in order to elicit on-line inferences. 
For the first task in Berthiaume et al. (2010), children with ADHD were more 
confident in their incorrect answers to the clues but answered with the same accuracy as 
comparison children.  Thus, children with ADHD were less likely to question false 
assumptions due to their overconfidence in comparison to non-diagnosed peers.  This 
overconfidence may contribute to generating poor inferences.  For the think-aloud task, 
children with ADHD made more incorrect explanatory inferences (comparable to 
Thurlow and van den Broek’s [1997] coherence inferences), but were not significantly 
different from comparison children in how many correct or incorrect inferences were 
made in other categories.  The explanatory inferences are the most important type of 
inference to create, as they are integral to causal structure.  Thus, making incorrect 
explanatory inferences is problematic because causal structure directly affects 
construction of coherent story representations (Berthiaume et al., 2010). 
The results of Berthiaume et al. (2010) seem to be surprisingly limited given the 
larger inference-generation differences seen between adept and poor comprehenders for 
non-diagnostic groups.  One possible explanation for these limited findings is that 
children completed this task at the end of the session when they were already 
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experiencing fatigue.  Another, perhaps more persuasive argument, is that the task itself 
required frequent questioning (i.e., after each sentence) during a very short story (i.e., 
only 13 sentences), which may have been too demanding for these young children.  As 
suggested above, this may have created an excessive cognitive load for these children, 
and may not have left enough room for the story to develop in a meaningful way in 
between think-aloud questions.  This may have resulted in limited group differences in 
inference generation because both groups were cognitively overloaded.  The current 
study addressed the limitations in Berthiaume et al. and expanded upon the investigation 
of inferencing abilities of children with ADHD.  
The Current Study 
The current study investigated differences in inference generation between 
children with ADHD and their comparison peers, using a think-aloud procedure similar 
to Berthiaume et al. (2010).  However, to address the limitations of Berthiaume et al., 
children were tested with longer stories and asked to think aloud less frequently.  In 
addition, children’s recall (including inferences during recall) was assessed in several 
ways after story completion.  The present study explored two main questions related to 
inference generation.  First, do children with ADHD create the same number and types of 
inferences as do their comparison peers, both while constructing a story representation 
and while recalling the story? Second, does experiencing the think-aloud procedure 
differentially affect story comprehension during recall for these diagnostic groups, when 
children are given ample time between think-aloud pause points? 
In the current study, children were approximately 7 to 11 years of age.  This age 
group was chosen because Kendeou et al. (2008) showed that children as young as 6 
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years of age can generate causal inferences.  However, because there is ample evidence 
that children with ADHD exhibit story comprehension difficulties throughout the 
elementary school years (Berthiaume, et al., 2006; Derefinko, et al., 2009; Flake, et al., 
2007; Flory, Milich, Lorch, Hayden, Strange, & Welsh, 2006; Lorch, et al., 2007; Lorch, 
Deiner, et al., 1999; Lorch, Sanchez, et al., 1999; Lorch, Eastham, et al., 2004; Lorch, 
O’Neil, et al., 2004; Lorch, Milich, Astrin, & Berthiaume, 2006; Lorch, et al., 2010; 
Renz, et al., 2003) a slightly older group than that of Kendeou et al. was chosen.  
Kendeou et al. also showed that inferences generalize across media types.  Therefore, 
televised stories were used, to avoid any confounds with reading difficulties and to enable 
the use of stories with complex plotlines.  Children watched episodes of a television 
program (Growing Pains) and were stopped periodically during the program and asked 
what they are thinking about the story.  This procedure allowed for the collection of on-
line information about the nature of the inferences that children were making.  They had 
extended periods of time between the points where the story was paused in order to 
lessen the types of interference that may have affected the Berthiaume et al. study due to 
frequent pauses.  Children also experienced a control condition in which the pause points 
remained, but they are not asked to think aloud.  This allowed for a within-group 
comparison of the impact of the think-aloud procedure on story comprehension.  
The first research question that this study sought to answer is whether children 
with ADHD create the same number and types of inferences as their comparison peers. 
This will be addressed in both the think-aloud pauses and free recall. If children with 
ADHD struggle with generating inferences, this deficit could be expressed in multiple 
ways through this procedure.  Children with ADHD may not create as many inferences 
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overall, or they may create only certain types of inferences, such as the inferences 
generated by poor comprehenders (Laing & Kamhi, 2002).  As discussed above, 
coherence inferences require the comprehender to infer implicit connections between 
multiple events from a story, whereas elaborative inferences only add unneeded details to 
an event within the story. Thus, if children with ADHD generate fewer coherence 
inferences, they are likely to miss causal connections among story events. Because 
children with ADHD have previously displayed deficits in understanding causal relations 
(e.g. Lorch, Sanchez, et al., 1999), it is likely they will display a deficit in generating 
coherence inferences relative to their peers.   Inferences were also judged on the basis of 
whether they are accurate/plausible, or implausible/inaccurate.  It was expected that 
children with ADHD would generated more inaccurate inferences, consistent with 
Berthiaume et al. (2010). 
The second research question focuses on whether giving children with ADHD and 
comparison children the opportunity to think aloud during a televised story would 
differentially affect children’s comprehension of the story during free recall and/or cued 
recall following the story.  The think-aloud task may have a positive effect on later 
comprehension for both groups but a stronger positive effect for typically developing 
children, such as the pattern seen in average and below average comprehenders (Laing & 
Kamhi, 2002).  This may occur because the think-aloud condition may encourage extra 
processing of the story, which typically developing children may utilize more effectively 
than children with ADHD.  However, the think-aloud task could have a neutral or 
negative effect on either one or both diagnostic groups.  A negative effect would be 
consistent with van den Broek et al. (2001)’s finding that the requirement to pause and 
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answer questions interfered with comprehension for some age groups.  However, the 
current methodology questioned significantly less often, which may help to avoid the 
problem van den Broek et al. observed.  The finally possibility would be a reduction of 
the comprehension gap between groups.  If comparison children already are doing very 
well, they may not need the extra processing occurring during the think-aloud condition, 
but an opportunity for extra reflection on the story may assist children with ADHD.  If 
thinking aloud is associated with improved comprehension for children with ADHD, it 
may be a useful tool to include in story comprehension interventions for these children. 
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Chapter 2 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 59 children participated in the study.  Of these children, 22 were 
formally diagnosed with either combined type or inattentive type ADHD, and the 
remaining 37 children were part of the non-referred comparison group.  Children’s ages 
ranged between 7 years 0 months to 11 years 2 months.  The groups were not different in 
mean age or in the distributions of gender, χ2 (1) = 1.14, p > .10, or ethnicity, χ2(1) =  
3.88, p > .10, (see Table 1).  Reflecting the demographics of the region, 76.3% were 
Caucasian and 15.3% were African American.  An additional 6 children were recruited 
(five with ADHD), but had to be excluded from analyses for the following reasons: two 
did not fit symptoms for their respective diagnostic groups (one comparison child), two 
had IQ scores below 70, one exhibited co-morbid Asperger Syndrome, and one had 
several speech difficulties. 
Children with ADHD were recruited from local clinics and participant pools from 
previous studies.  Twenty of the children with ADHD were diagnosed with 
ADHD/combined type according to the DSM-IV-TR criteria, and two children were 
diagnosed with inattentive type.  In order to be included in this study, children with 
ADHD must have had a diagnosis of ADHD/combined or inattentive type.  The diagnosis 
was based on parental report of the clinical diagnosis of their child and confirmed with a 
structured interview and ratings on the Conners Parent Rating Scale (1997). 
 If they expressed an interest in participating, they were asked to sign a form 
giving permission to be contacted by the researcher about participation in this study.   
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Table 1 
Demographic and diagnostic information for children with ADHD and comparison 
peers. 
 Category ADHD Comparison T 
Age in months 108.00 (14.94) 110.11 (13.86) 0.55 
Mother's years of education 14.77 (2.27) 15.94 (2.36) 1.91 
Father's years of Education 15.05 (2.61) 16.24 (2.71) 1.55 
KBIT- Total IQ 109.23 (13.25) 120.41 (10.94) 3.51** 
KBIT –Matrices IQ 104.36 (18.27) 113.86 (10.82) 2.52* 
KBIT- Verbal IQ 111.95 (12.21) 121.35 (13.17) 2.72* 
OWLS Expressive Language 90.23 (10.09) 108.81 (18.26) 4.38** 
Gender (male) 15 (68.2%) 20 (54.1%) 1.060 
DSM Inattentive Symptoms 7.09 (1.66) 0.19 (4.62) 23.92** 
DSM Hyperactive 6.82 (1.71) 0.65 (1.14)` 16.67** 
DSM ODD symptoms 3.95 (2.59) 0.54 (0.99) 7.21** 
Conners ADHD T-score 73.55 (9.82) 45.89 (6.21) 13.28** 
 
Gender (% male) 68 54  
Ethnicity (%)  
  Caucasian 15 (68.2%) 30 (81.1%) 
  African American 5 (22.7%) 4 (10.8%) 
  Biracial 2 (9.1%) 1 (2.7%) 
 Other (Asian, Hispanic) 0 2 (5.4%) 
* p value ≤ 0.05 
** p value ≤ 0.001 
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Comparison children and additional children with ADHD were recruited through an 
announcement in local newspapers, from fliers distributed throughout the community, 
and from participants from previous studies who stated that they wished to be contacted 
about other research opportunities.  Comparison peers were not be required to be 
symptom-free, but had fewer than three symptoms for either dimension of the 
ADHD/combined type.  The ADHD and comparison groups were significantly different 
on all diagnostic measures (see Table 1).  
Parents who expressed an interest were contacted by phone and asked screening 
questions related to exclusion criteria.  Because the purpose is to understand the effects of 
ADHD and not the effects of medication, children were excluded from the study if they 
are taking any psychoactive medication that could not be discontinued for the 24 hours 
prior to participating in the study.  In addition, comparison children were excluded if they 
had ever been referred for any behavioral or learning disabilities. 
Upon arriving at the Child Development Research Facility, informed consent was 
obtained from the parent by a graduate research assistant.  Children were asked to give 
their verbal assent to participate in the study.  For their participation, children were paid 
$15 dollars for the first session and $25 for the second session.  They also were allowed 
to choose a small toy at each session. 
Materials 
Growing Pains.  Two episodes of the situation comedy Growing Pains were used 
as the narrative stories in the think-aloud task.  The episodes were originally aired on 
commercial television in 1986 and last approximately 22 minutes.  The two episodes are 
called ‘Charity Begins at Home’ (Birthday) and ‘Do You Believe in Magic?’ (Magic).  
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Both episodes have a complex plot, containing a main character attempting to solve a 
problem and multiple sub-plots, ending with a moral lesson.  See Appendix A for plot 
summaries.  The episodes were broken down into story units for earlier studies (Lorch et 
al., 2000), where each unit represents a single idea or event.  The Birthday episode has 
407 units and the Magic episode has 615.  Each unit had been rated by undergraduate 
students on the importance of the event to the overall story, using a Likert scale ranging 
from one (least important) to seven (most important) to the plot of the story.  Those in the 
highest quartile are defined as highly important events, and those in the lowest quartile 
were defined as low important events.  
Each of these episodes had pauses inserted at five points. At these points, a black 
screen was edited into the episode to indicate the beginning of the pause. Each pause 
occurred near an event of high importance (ranked in the top quartile), and generally 
occurred before key events are explained by the characters.  
A set of 20 questions developed for previous studies was used to test story recall. 
Five questions tested factual events and the remainder tested causal relations among 
events, either explicitly stated (seven) or needing to be inferred (eight) (see Appendix B 
and C). 
Think-aloud Practice Story.  A short story, ‘The Father, His Son, and Their 
Donkey,’ was used during a think-aloud training procedure.  This fable is 426 words long 
and contains 63 story events.  The story line of this fable concerns a father and son who, 
while on their way to sell their donkey, encounter conflicting advice from local townsfolk 
about who should ride the donkey.  By the end of the story they find themselves taking 
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ridiculous steps to follow the advice and lose their donkey in the process (see Appendix 
D for full story). 
Standardized Testing.  Two standardized tests were used to estimate intelligence 
and to assess oral expressive language.  The Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test (KBIT-2) 
and the Expressive Language subtest of the Oral and Written Language Scale (OWLS) 
were used. 
The KBIT-2 (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004) takes approximately 20 minutes to 
administer and provides an estimate of intelligence.  It has two scales: Crystallized and 
Fluid intelligence.  The crystallized scale is a verbal scale that tests intelligence with two 
types of items: verbal knowledge and riddles.  Reading and spelling are not required for 
these subtests.  The Fluid scale is a nonverbal test that uses matrices.  An average 
intelligence on the KBIT-2 is 100 with a standard deviation of 15.  In the current study, 
only the verbal knowledge and matrices portions were administered.  The verbal portion 
of this test consists of showing children pictures and asking them to point to the picture 
that fits a word or definition best, and produces an estimate of verbal intelligence.  The 
matrices subtest requires children to choose a picture that is analogous to or fits into a 
pattern of other pictures, and thus provides an estimate of non-verbal intelligence.  The 
K-BIT2 has a test re-test reliability of .88 for the composite IQ, and has a .77 correlation 
to a full IQ score from the WISC-IV (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004).  In the current study, 
although the groups differed on average IQ scores, both ADHD and Comparison groups 
had above average IQ scores (see Table 1) 
The Oral and Written Language Scale (OWLS) consists of both receptive and 
expressive subtests (Carrow-Woolfolk, 1995) but only the oral expressive portion was 
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administered in this study.  This test takes between 20 and 40 minutes.  Children were 
shown pictures and verbally prompted to complete or create sentences using the pictures 
as cues.  Items were scored for their accuracy and labeled as preferred, acceptable, or 
incorrect.  Answers may be incorrect based on lack of response or errors in grammar, 
semantics, or pragmatics.  The standardized score for the oral expression scale was 
calculated.  This test has a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15 points.  The test re-
test reliability for 8-11 year old children is .80 for the expressive language scale, and the 
inter-rater reliability is between .96 for 7 year old children and .93 for 10 year old 
children (Carrow-Woolfolk, 1995).  In the current study, the comparison children scored 
significantly above the mean, but children with ADHD scored below the mean (see Table 
1).   
Facility.  Sessions took place at the Child Development Research Facility, which 
is a small home-like laboratory located at the University of Kentucky.  The structured 
interview was administered to the parent in the waiting room.  Children completed all 
tasks in a small room with a single experimenter.  The child sat at the long side of 2.5 by 
3.5 ft table with their back to the door, and the experimenter sat perpendicular to the child 
at the table and remained in the room for the entire session.  A television and DVD player 
were located on a cart on the other side of the table, and positioned so that the child had 
to turn 45º to see the screen.  A box of toys and any materials the experimenter may have 
needed were on a desk in the corner of the room.  The entire session was recorded from a 
camera mounted on the wall, which captured the child, the TV screen, and edge of where 
the experimenter sits. The child’s responses during the entire session were also recorded 
by the experimenter on a digital voice recorder. 
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Procedure  
The parent/guardian brought their child to the Child Development Research 
Facility on the university campus on two separate occasions.  The data collected for this 
study consisted of two parts: Information collected from the parent about his or her child, 
and data collected from the child in the tasks and on the standardized tests.  Parents were 
interviewed by a trained graduate student during the first session in order to confirm 
ADHD diagnosis or its absence for comparison children.  The parents answered questions 
in a semi-structured interview that contains questions based on the DSM-IV criteria for 
ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and conduct disorder (CD).  Each question 
asked about symptoms relating to these disorders.  If the parent affirmed that the child 
does have that symptom the parent was asked to give an example of the typical behavior, 
whether the parent believes the behavior is age appropriate, and if the behavior impairs 
performance in school or in a social setting.  If a child with ADHD failed to meet DSM-
IV criteria per the parent’s endorsement of the symptoms of ADHD then the child’s data 
was excluded from this study.  Data from comparison children were excluded if the 
parent endorsed three or more items on the hyperactivity/impulsivity or inattentive scales.  
To confirm the diagnosis, parents also completed the Conner’s Parent Rating Scales 
(CPRS-R:S) and the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL), which provided information 
about internalizing and externalizing behavior.  These tests are widely used rating forms 
to measure a child’s level of ADHD symptoms in a reliable and standardized method.  On 
these forms, parents checked to what extent their child displays certain behaviors. 
While the parent was completing the measures listed above, the child began the 
tasks with a trained researcher.  The current study was a part of a larger study, and each 
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session lasted approximately 90 minutes.  During each session, the child experienced one 
televised episode of Growing Pains, a standardized test, and one audio-taped story.  The 
experimenter escorted the child to the testing room and talked with the child to establish 
rapport.  The study was verbally described to the child and assent was obtained.  After the 
child became comfortable in the testing room, the researcher either began a control 
episode of a television program, or in the case of the experimental condition began the 
think-aloud training protocol.   
It was a concern that children at first would not be comfortable speaking about 
their thoughts to the unfamiliar experimenter, would not know what to say, or would say 
things off topic.  Therefore, The Father, Son, and Their Donkey, mentioned above, was 
used as a training story before the think-aloud condition of the first task (Lynch and van 
den Broek, 2007).  If the control condition occurred during the first session, the training 
was done in the second session before the think-aloud condition.  The story was read out 
loud by the researcher, who would stop during the story in order to teach the child about 
thinking aloud.  This teaching process was scaffolded across three pauses.  At the first 
pause the experimenter gave the child an example of three things that the experimenter 
could be thinking about the story.  During the second pause the child responded.  If the 
child did not know what to say, or said things inappropriate to story events, the 
experimenter gave further think-aloud examples.  The child was also prompted for more 
information to ensure he or she had said everything that he or she was thinking.  During 
the final pause in the story, the child was prompted again but only was given examples if 
the child failed to respond at first.  If the child failed to give more information after a 
second prompt the child was allowed to pause without being given further examples.  All 
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of the examples given by the experimenter were either factual or inferential think-aloud 
responses.  Once this training procedure was finished the think-aloud condition of 
Growing Pains began. 
To begin the think-aloud task the experimenter explained the first task, which in 
each session involved viewing an episode of the television program Growing Pains.  
Across the two sessions, children participated in two conditions with order 
counterbalanced: think-aloud and control.  The episode that was assigned to each 
condition also was counterbalanced.  The child watched the programs with a set of toys 
available and was allowed to play with the toys.  The toys were a transformer figure, a 
remote control car, a handheld game, a drawing toy (either Magna Doodle or Etch-a-
Sketch), a plastic doll (human or dinosaur), and either a slinky or a pin-impression toy.  
The toys were present in order to provide a more natural environment where distractions 
were possible and attention to the program could vary (Lorch, Sanchez, et al., 1999).  For 
the think-aloud condition, the child was asked to think aloud during five 30-second 
pauses (think-aloud condition).  For the other story the child was not be asked to think 
aloud during the pause and instead was allowed to continue playing with the toys that 
were available during the show.  The control condition was designed to make sure any 
differences in later recall were not due to pauses in the story but to the opportunity to 
think aloud.   
To begin the think-aloud condition episode, the experimenter gave a general 
explanation of the procedure: the child would watch a show that would pause 
occasionally and at which time they would be asked questions.  In the control condition, 
instead of explaining that the child was going to be asked a question, the experimenter 
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said that the child could just continue playing with the toys during the pauses.  The show 
was then started.  At each pause the experimenter stopped the show during the pre-
inserted blank screen so that the pause lasted 30 seconds.  In the think-aloud condition, 
the experimenter asked the child to “Tell me everything you are thinking about what is 
happening in the story.” The child was then prompted once to make sure that the child’s 
response was complete.  If the child had not finished thinking aloud before the 30-second 
pause was over, the experimenter continued to hold the show until the child had finished.  
In the control condition, the child was allowed to continue playing with toys during the 
30-second pauses in the story.  If in the control condition the child began to say what they 
are thinking, then the experimenter would say, “Remember, you can keep playing with 
these toys if you like, but we aren’t going to talk about the story this time.” After the 
questioning was finished and at least 30 seconds had passed, the experimenter resumed 
the show. 
After the Growing Pains episode, the experimenter showed the child a picture of 
the characters and reminded the child of the characters’ names.  Then the child was asked 
to retell the entire story from beginning to end.  The child was given two prompts to elicit 
a complete recall.  Finally, the experimenter asked cued recall questions about the 
episode.  The questions probed for recall of factual events and causal connections 
between events.  Some questions tested causal connections that had been explicitly stated 
and others tested connects that had to be inferred (see Appendix B and C for questions).   
After recall testing for the Growing Pains episode, the experimenter administered 
either the KBIT-2 intelligence test during the first session or the OWLS subtest for 
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expressive language in the second session.  This study was part of a larger experiment, so 
the child completed other tasks after the break following the KBIT-2 or OWLS. 
In summary, on each of two days the children participated in the study, they 
experienced an episode of Growing Pains and a standardized test.  The first task is a 
televised story during which they were asked to think aloud about the story on one day, 
or in the control condition on the other day wait for the story to resume.  Next they 
completed a verbally administered standardized test, either KBIT-2 or OWLS.  Finally, 
they completed tasks that were part of the larger study. 
Coding 
 Children’s responses to think-aloud prompts, recall, and questions were 
transcribed verbatim from the voice recordings and video tapes and double checked for 
accuracy.  Think-aloud and recall transcripts were parsed into event units. 
Think-Aloud Statements.  The primary purpose of examining the statements the 
child makes during the think-aloud condition of the Growing Pains episodes was to 
determine to what extent the children spontaneously generated inferences.  Thus, only the 
inferences related to the story line were of interest.  In order to determine whether an 
event was a story-line inference or another type of statement, event units from the think-
aloud transcripts were be compared to the transcript of all event units contained in the 
original story up to the current pause.  If the child states an event that does not correspond 
to an event in the complete event transcript but is still related to the story line, then it was 
coded as an inference.  For example, during a pause in the Growing Pains episode Magic, 
a child might say, “I’m thinking that when Ben offered to clean Mike’s room/ he was 
really trying to trick him/ and get him to think that the rock really is magic.” The first part 
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of this statement retells an event in which the younger brother walks up to Mike saying 
he will clean Mike’s room for money.  The next two parts of this statement refer to Ben 
tricking his brother and his purpose in tricking him.  These have not yet been explained 
by any character in the show, or even necessarily have to be true given what has already 
been seen.  Therefore, this statement would have been coded as having one fact (Ben 
offered to clean Mike’s room) and two inferential components (Ben is tricking his 
brother; Ben is trying to get Mike to think that the rock is magic).  Two coders developed 
and agreed upon a system for finding inferences.  Reliability for indentifying inferences 
was calculated on 60 stories (34% for recall and pauses) and achieved a reliability of κ 
=.73. 
After events were coded as inferences or other statements, the inferences were 
further coded by type: coherence, elaborative, or predictive.  Coherence inferences were 
defined as those statements that explain events or connect events in order to help make 
sense of the story line.  Often, these explanations of events answer ‘why’ questions, such 
as ‘why did the mother and sister come out of Mike’s closet in Magic?’ Elaborative 
inferences are defined as those statements that add information to the events of the story, 
but are unnecessary to movement of the story line.  An example of an elaborative 
inference could be a character showing an emotion, if that emotion does not cause future 
events.  Finally, Predictive inferences are statements of events that have not yet occurred.  
These predictions usually are based on events and facts that have already occurred, and 
suggest possible future outcomes. 
Next, each inference statement was scored as accurate/plausible, or 
implausible/inaccurate.  Inferences were coded as accurate/plausible when the child talks 
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about an event that is not explicitly stated in the story but either does indeed occur later in 
the story or is a reasonable conclusion based on the events in the story.  For instance, 
immediately after the pause for the statement above when Ben offers to clean Mike’s 
room, the family discusses their purpose for tricking Mike, so an inference describing 
their reasons for tricking Mike could be determined to be accurate or not.  
Implausible/inaccurate inferences fail to take into account all the facts or events already 
seen in the story and/or include an error in logic.  Two coders scored all story pauses for 
inference types and accuracy, and averages were computed for each category.  Pearson’s 
r was above .85 for all categories (see Table 2) 
Statements made during the think-aloud task that were not inferences about the 
story line were not coded.  Such events may include retelling of events that explicitly 
occurred in the story, extraneous statements not related to the events of the story (“ I am 
thinking it is a sunny day outside”), statements relating the events of the story to events in 
the child’s personal life (“ this reminds me of a time I tried to trick my brother…”), and 
inferences about the characters fictional universe outside of the immediate story line 
(such as “Mike will one day become an accountant”) (Berthiaume et al., 2010). 
Free Recall of Story. After the program, the child retold the entire story that he 
or she just saw.  As noted above, the recall transcripts were parsed into individual event 
units.  Each unit was classified as an event that explicitly occurred in the story or as one 
of the other types of statements discussed above.  Those events that explicitly occurred in 
the story were compared to the full list of story units and matched to the unit they best 
represented.  Two coders scored 45 recall stories (38%) for event units and achieved a 
reliability of κ = .72.  For inferences coded during the recall, 36 (30%) stories were coded 
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reliability was excellent for most categories (Pearson r < .90), with the except of 
elaborative inaccurate (r = .71) and predictive accurate ( r = .80) which were relatively 
rare. (see Table 2) 
Table 2 
Pearson’s r Reliability Scores as a function of Inference Types and Accuracy 
 Pauses 
(100%) 
Recall 
(30%) 
Coherence Accurate 0.96 0.93 
Coherence Inaccurate 0.89 0.90 
Elaborative Accurate 0.97 0.96 
Elaborative Inaccurate 0.95 0.70 
Predictive Accurate 1.00 0.80 
Predictive Inaccurate 0.87 1.00 
 
Events described by the child that were not a retelling of something that explicitly 
occurred in the story were coded into one of the other types of statements: story-line 
inferences or extraneous statements.  Story-line inferences were coded for type and 
accuracy.   
Cued recall questions.  The correct answer(s) were defined for each of the cued 
recall questions.  Children’s responses were scored as correct or incorrect relative to what 
has been defined as the targeted response.  
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Chapter 3 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Preliminary analyses were conducted to determine whether the pattern of findings 
for any of the dependent variables (inferences generated during pauses, inferences 
generated during recall, free recall of story units, performance on cued recall questions) 
varied as a function of the order of experiencing conditions (think-aloud first, control 
first) or the specific Growing Pains story episode (Magic, Birthday).  For condition order, 
there were no significant interactions with diagnostic group for any of the dependent 
measures, so condition order was not included in any of the primary analyses.  Similarly, 
story episode did not interact with group for most of the dependent measures.  The only 
exceptions occurred when free recall was analyzed as a function of the causal chain status 
or of the importance level of story units.  These exceptions will be addressed in the 
relevant sections below. 
All effects were evaluated in mixed analyses of variance (ANOVA), with planned 
contrasts for interactions involving group.  The Bonferroni procedure was used to control 
for family-wise error rate, with alpha < .05 unless otherwise noted.  As indicated earlier, 
comparison children scored significantly higher on the K-BIT-2 test of IQ and the OWLS 
expressive language test than did children with ADHD.  Both groups demonstrated above 
average mean IQ scores, but the mean expressive language scores of children with 
ADHD were below average.  Because expressive language difficulties have been linked 
to verbal production of stories (Freer, Hayden, Lorch, & Milich, 2011), analyses also 
were conducted considering the OWLS expressive language score as a covariate.  Except 
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for specific instances reported below, the covariate was not significantly related to the 
dependent measure or did not change the pattern of significant effects. 
Inference Generation 
 The primary research question was whether children with ADHD differ in the 
inferences that they generate while forming their understanding of a story (as measured 
during story pauses) and while recalling the story.  For inferences generated during 
pauses, this question was addressed in group (comparison, ADHD) x accuracy (accurate, 
inaccurate) mixed ANOVAs for each type of inference (i.e., coherence, elaborative, 
predictive).  For each type of inference, children generated more accurate than inaccurate 
inferences: coherence, F (1, 57) = 78.30, p < .001, η2 = .58, elaborative, F (1, 57) = 
38.32, p < .001, η2 = .40, and predictive, F (1, 57) = 14.88, p < .001, η2 = .21.  
Comparison children generated more coherence inferences than did children with ADHD, 
F (1, 57) = 4.10, p < .05, η2 = .07, and this effect was qualified by a significant diagnostic 
group x accuracy interaction, F (1, 57) = 13.50, p = .001, η2 = .19 (see Table 3 and Figure 
1).  Children with ADHD made significantly fewer accurate coherence inferences than 
did comparison children, t (57) = 2.88, p < .05, d =.76, but the groups were not 
significantly different in the number of inaccurate coherence inferences, t (57) = -1.16, p 
> .10, d = .31.  In other words, the difference between the number of accurate and 
inaccurate coherence inferences was greater for comparison children than for children 
with ADHD, t (57) = 3.67, p < .01, d = .97 (see Table 3).  The groups did not differ 
significantly on the number of elaborative, F (1, 57) = 2.24, p > 0.10, η2 = .04, or 
predictive inferences, F (1, 57) = 0.08, p > 0.10, η2 = .01, nor were the interactions of  
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Table 3 
Mean number (standard deviations) of coherence inferences generated during story 
pauses as a function of diagnostic group and accuracy of inferences 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
Mean number (standard deviations) of coherence inferences generated during story 
pauses as a function of group and accuracy of inferences 
 
 
group and accuracy significant for elaborative, F (1, 57) = 2.50, p > 0.10, η2 = .04, or 
predictive inferences , F (1, 57) = 1.10, p < 0.10, η2 = .02.   
For inferences generated during recall, group x condition x accuracy mixed 
ANOVAs were conducted for coherence and elaborative inferences; not surprisingly, 
children rarely made predictive inferences during recall.  Again, children generated more 
accurate than inaccurate coherence, F (1, 57) = 79.75, p < .001, η2 = .58, and elaborative 
inferences, F (1, 57) = 54.54, p < .001, η2 = .49.  Similar to the results for inferences 
during story pauses, comparison children generated more coherence inferences than did 
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 Coherence Inferences Comparison ADHD 
Accurate 5.32 (3.38) 2.98 (2.28) 
Inaccurate 0.59 (0.86) 1.02 (1.17) 
Difference 4.73 (3.19) 1.95 (1.97) 
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children with ADHD, F (1, 57) = 13.06, p =.001, η2 = .19.  This effect was qualified by a 
significant group x accuracy interaction, F (1, 57) = 11.29, p = .001, η2 = .17 (see Table 4 
and Figure 2).  Comparison children stated more accurate coherence inferences than did 
children with ADHD, t (57) =3.61, p < .01, d = .95, but the group difference did not reach 
significance for inaccurate coherence inferences, t (57) = 1.90, p > .10, d = .50.  The 
difference between the number of accurate and inaccurate coherence inferences generated 
in the recall was greater for comparison children than for children with ADHD, t (57) = 
3.36, p < .01, d  = .89.  Comparison children also tended to generate more elaborative 
inferences during recall than did children with ADHD, F (1, 57) =3.89, p = .053, η2 = .06,  
Table 4 
Mean number (standard deviations) of coherence and elaborative inferences generated 
during story recall as a function of diagnostic group and accuracy of inferences 
 
Coherence Inf. Comparison ADHD 
Accurate 5.53 (3.33) 2.64 (2.22) 
Inaccurate 1.01 (.93) 0.59 (.61) 
 Elaborative Inf. 
Accurate 6.41 (4.94) 3.98 (3.93) 
Inaccurate 0.92 (.85) 0.73 (.83) 
Figure 2 
Mean number (standard deviations) of coherence inferences generated during story 
recall as a function of group and accuracy of inferences 
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a trend qualified by a marginally significant group x accuracy interaction, F (1, 57) 
=3.57, p = .064, η2 = .06 (see Table 4 and Figure 2).  Although pattern of means for 
elaborative inferences resembled that of coherence inferences, none of the follow-ups 
reached significance on t tests.  
Impact of Thinking Aloud  
 Free recall.  The second research question was whether asking children to think 
aloud during story pauses over the course of the story would differentially affect the story 
representation of comparison and ADHD groups.  The impact of thinking aloud during 
story pauses was evaluated for free recall as a function of each of two story structure 
variables (causal chain status and importance level of story units), percent correct on 
three types of cued recall questions (inferred causal relations, explicit causal relations, 
and factual information), and for inferences generated during recall (based on the analysis 
described above).  For recall of events as a function of causal chain status, a group 
(comparison, ADHD) x condition (think-aloud, control) x causal chain status (on or off 
the causal chain) mixed ANOVA was conducted.  Replicating past findings (Lorch et al., 
2000; Lorch, Eastham, et al., 2004), comparison children recalled more story events than 
did children with ADHD, F (1, 57) = 20.46, p < .001, η2 = .26, and children remembered 
more story events on the causal chain than events off the causal chain, F (1, 57) = 202.67, 
p < .001, η2 = .78.  These effects were qualified by a significant group by causal chain 
status interaction, F (1, 57) = 27.09, p < .001, η2 = .32, such that the effects of causal 
chain status on recall was greater for comparison children than for children with ADHD 
(see Table 5 and Figure 3).  Similarly, in a group (comparison, ADHD) x condition 
(think-aloud, control) x importance level (high, medium, low) mixed ANOVA of free  
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Table 5 
Mean percent (standard deviations) of events recalled during recall as a function of 
causal chain status or importance or events and diagnostic group. 
 
  Comparison ADHD 
Causal Chain Recall   
On Chain 17.60 (9.29) 7.93 (12.06) 
Off Chain 6.00 (4.69) 2.55 (6.07) 
Importance Levels   
High  17.66 (8.76) 8.27 (11.37) 
Medium 7.77 (5.30) 3.11 (6.91) 
low 6.09 (5.45) 2.80 (7.07) 
 
Figure 3 
Mean percent of story events recalled as a function of diagnostic group and causal chain 
status. 
 
  
Figure 4 
Mean percent of story events recalled as a function of diagnostic group and importance 
level 
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recall events, comparison children remembered more story events than did children with 
ADHD, F (1, 57) = 19.50, p < .001, η2 = .26, and recall increased as importance level 
increased, F (2, 114) =  180.95, p< .001, η2 = .76.  These effects once again were 
qualified by a group x importance level interaction, F (2, 114) = 21.39, p < .001, η2 = .27.  
Although recall for both groups increased as importance increased, the slope of this 
function was steeper for comparison children than for children with ADHD, F (1, 57) = 
26.81, p < .001, η2 = .32.  At the highest level of importance, children with ADHD 
recalled fewer than half as many units of high importance than their comparison peers 
(see Table 5 and Figure 4).   
Important to the present research question, group differences in recall and 
interactions with the story structure variables did not differ for the think-aloud and 
control conditions.  However, for the recall measures there were several cases in which 
both groups were affected in the same way by the think-aloud condition.  Children 
recalled more events on the casual chain when in the think-aloud condition as opposed to 
the control condition, F (1, 57) =9.25, p < .01, η2 = .14.  Children’s recall also increased 
as importance level increased more sharply in the think-aloud condition than in the  
Table 6 
 
Mean percent (standard deviations) of events recalled during recall as a function of 
causal chain status or importance or events and condition story experienced in. 
 
  Think-aloud Control 
Causal Chain Recall     
On Chain 13.85 (8.08) 11.68 (8.23) 
Off Chain 4.10 (4.02) 4.45 (4.61) 
Importance Levels*     
High  13.78 (8.24) 12.16 (7.76) 
Medium 5.31 (4.61) 5.57 (5.00) 
Low 4.22 (4.87) 4.64 (5.57) 
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control condition, F (1, 57) = 3.23, p = .078, η2 = .05.  Thus, they recalled more events of 
high importance when in the think-aloud condition (see Table 6). 
Cued recall.  Another way to determine if the conditions affected performance is 
to analyze the cued recall questions.  In a group x condition mixed ANOVA conducted 
for each type of recall question (factual, explicit causal, and inferred causal), diagnostic 
groups differed significantly on all question types: inferred causal, F (1, 57) = 13.28, p = 
.001, η2 = .19, factual, F (1, 57) = 22.05, p < .001, η2 = .28, and explicit causal questions, 
F (1, 57) = 10.75, p < .01, η2 = .16 (see Table 7).  The condition that the story was 
experienced in did not have any significant differential effects between diagnostic groups 
on any of the questions types: inferred causal, F (1, 57) = .25, p > 0.10, η2 < .00, factual, 
F (1, 57) = .53, p > 0.10, η2 = .01, and explicit causal, F (1, 57) = 1.80, p > 0.10, η2 = .03. 
Expressive language scores on the OWLS were a significant covariate on all three 
questions types, however it did not affect the significance of the inferred or factual 
questions.  After accounting for OWLS the group effect for explicit causal questions was 
marginal, F (1, 57) = 2.85, p = .097, η2 = .05.  Children with ADHD were not able to 
answer any type of question with the same level of accuracy as did their peers.   
Table 7 
Mean percent of questions answer correctly as a function of diagnostic and question type. 
 
  
  Comparison Mean ADHD Mean 
Explicit Questions % 59.85 (28.90) 39.29 (37.48) 
Inferred Question % 51.96 (26.53) 32.71 (31.58) 
Factual Question % 75.95 (25.81) 49.66 (33.47) 
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Secondary Findings 
In addition to major question addressed in this study, secondary analyses were 
conducted to evaluate effects of condition order and story episode.  In addition to the 
effects that the conditions had on the recall of the stories, there were several effects of 
what order the conditions were experienced.  However, no diagnostic group differences 
were found as an effect of the order of conditions.  When conducting think-aloud 
order (think-aloud first, think-aloud second) x condition (think-aloud, control) x causal 
chain status (on, off), as well think-aloud order x condition x importance level mixed 
ANOVAs, significant think-aloud order x condition interactions emerged (Causal chain F 
(1,55) = 6.34, p < .05, η2 = .10; Importance Level F(1,55) = 4.670, p < .05, η2 = .08) such 
that if the control condition occurred first, children were more likely recall fewer events 
during the control condition than the think-aloud condition, but if the think-aloud 
occurred first then children recalled events equally in both conditions.    
As stated in the preliminary analyses, a preliminary analysis was conducted to see 
if episode had any effects involving groups, there were 2 cases in which a significant 
effect was found involving recall.  However these results did not change the pattern of the 
results found in this study.  The two episodes of Growing Pains, Magic and Birthday, 
were included in group x episode x causal chain and group x episode x importance level 
mixed ANOVAs.  The recall of comparison children was more sharply differentiated as a 
function of causal chain status, F (1, 57) = 5.75, p < .05, η2 = .09, and as a function of 
importance level for the Magic episode than for the Birthday episode, F (2, 114) = 5.87, p 
< .01, η2 = .09.  Similarly, when episodes were included in analyses of inference 
generation, both groups generated more coherence inferences during recall for the Magic 
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episode than for the Birthday episode, F (1, 57) = 12.68, p = .001, η2 = .18, especially 
accurate coherence inferences, F (1, 57) = 4.20, p < .05, η2 = .70.  There were no effect 
for the other types of inferences, nor did the episodes have effects on the recall questions.   
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Chapter 4 
Discussion 
The current study sought to answer two main questions: whether children with 
ADHD differ from comparison peers on the number and type of inferences that they 
generate, and whether a think-aloud procedure would have differential effects on the 
story recall of these diagnostic groups.  As to the first question, children with ADHD 
generated fewer accurate coherence inferences both while forming their understanding of 
the story (think-aloud task) and while recalling it after having completed the story (free 
recall task).  In addition, the relative divergence between accurate and inaccurate 
coherence inferences was smaller for children with ADHD than for comparison peers.  
For the types of inferences less central to story comprehension, elaborative and predictive 
inferences, significant diagnostic group differences were not observed, although during 
free recall comparison children tended to generate more elaborative inferences than did 
children with ADHD.  Thus, children with ADHD are not different from their peers in the 
less essential categories but fall behind on generating the type of inference that is most 
essential to effective story comprehension, coherence inferences.  Regarding the second 
research question concerning the impact of the think-aloud condition, no significant 
interactions of group and condition were found for any recall measures, indicating that 
children with ADHD were not affected differently from their peers by thinking aloud.  
However, there is some evidence that the think-aloud condition improved recall for both 
groups. 
Children with ADHD make fewer accurate coherence inferences and exhibited a 
smaller difference between the number of accurate and inaccurate inferences than did 
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their comparison peers.  This deficit in the creation of the most essential category of 
inferences held true for both the think-aloud task and for the recall task.  In order to 
generate coherence inferences in the think-aloud task, children must integrate the 
information they have experienced and attempt to make sense of the story using this 
incomplete information.  This may include filling in missing information and creating 
causal connections for incomplete event sequences.  In order to generate coherence 
inferences during free recall, children must consolidate and organize story information 
into a logical story line, then add inferences to this storyline in order to fill in gaps of 
missing information that were not explained by the characters and to connect events 
across a completed sequence.  Why did children with ADHD fail to generate as many 
accurate coherence inferences as their peers in both these tasks? 
One reason that children with ADHD produce fewer accurate coherence 
inferences than do comparison children may relate to deficits in cognitive engagement 
and sustained attention that have previously been found to contribute to story 
comprehension difficulties (Flory et al., 2006; Lorch, Eastham, et al., 2004; Lorch et al., 
2006).  For example, prior to these studies difficulties in answering questions tapping 
causal relations have been tied to fewer periods of sustained cognitive engagement 
among children with ADHD than among comparison children (Lorch, Eastham, et al., 
2004), and unlike comparison children, children with ADHD fail to show increased 
cognitive engagement as sequences of important events develop (Lorch et al., 2006).  If 
children with ADHD in the current study also became less cognitively engaged with story 
events between pauses, they may have sought fewer connections among events when 
asked to think aloud during pauses and may have retained fewer connections on which to 
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base inferences during recall.  Related to cognitive engagement, problems in sustained 
attention have been found to mediate difficulties in maintaining goal structure during 
story narration among children with ADHD (Flory et al., 2006).  Inattention may cause 
children with ADHD to be more likely to miss critical story events.  Because inferences 
are generated from story events, missing some of these events due to inattention could 
prevent children from being able to connect story events together with coherence 
inferences.  In contrast, elaborative inferences often can be generated from a single event.  
Therefore, if children remember the single event, they have the information necessary to 
make an elaborative inference.  This is consistent with the finding in the current study 
that group differences were specific to coherence inferences. 
Another explanation for the diagnostic group difference in the number of accurate 
coherence inferences may be problems in executive function for children with ADHD 
(Barkley, 2006).  Executive functioning is the ability to organize, think critically, and 
integrate new information into an existing representation.  In particular as a story 
develops more fully, forming accurate coherence inferences may depend on effective 
executive function skills to integrate new information and organize the story into a 
coherent story representation.  Thus, generating accurate coherence inferences during 
pauses later in the story or during recall would depend on how well children have 
cumulatively integrated story events.  If children’s ongoing story representation consists 
of a relatively unorganized series of events, this disorganization and failure to integrate 
new information may prevent children from generating accurate coherence inferences to 
connect the events (Lynch & van den Broek, 2001). 
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Often classed with executive functions, working memory deficits among children 
with ADHD (Barkley, 2006) limit their capacity to hold and manipulate information 
stored in memory.  In order to generate accurate coherence inferences during the pauses, 
children must hold onto recent events but also connect those events with what has come 
before.  During the free recall task, the entire story has been completed, so children’s 
coherence inferences may depend on holding even more information in memory.  If 
comparison peers have more working memory resources available than do children with 
ADHD, comparison children may be able to keep active a greater number of important 
pieces of information, thus allowing them a better foundation from which to generate 
inferences that connect story events. 
In the current study, significant group differences in the number of accurate 
coherence inferences were observed across both tasks, but there were no significant 
group differences in the number of inaccurate coherence inferences in either task.  In 
contrast, Berthiaume et al. (2010)’s think-aloud procedure revealed no significant group 
difference in the number of accurate causal inferences, but children with ADHD made 
significantly more inaccurate causal inferences than did comparison peers.  This seeming 
discrepancy in findings may be rooted in differences in the demands of the two think-
aloud procedures, allowing the two studies to reveal different problems with causal 
inference generation among children with ADHD.  The current study asked children to 
hold several minutes of a story in their memory, using any or all of that information at 
occasional pauses.  To the extent that children are successful at maintaining key story 
events in working memory, such a procedure provides ample material on which to base 
coherence inferences, and might allow for considerable variability in the number of 
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accurate inferences that could be generated.  In contrast, the think-aloud procedure used 
by Berthiaume et al. provided minimal new information between pauses, but demanded 
that children hold pieces of information in memory across frequent pauses, with children 
sometimes spending more time thinking aloud than hearing story information.  Although 
differences in task demands of the two think-aloud procedures may have led to different 
specific findings, the finding common to both studies is that children with ADHD showed 
a deficit in causal inference making relative to comparison peers.  
Deficits in generating accurate coherence inferences among children with ADHD 
have implications for important aspects of story comprehension.  Coherence inferences 
are often necessary to make causal connections and to maintain goal sequences, both of 
which children with ADHD have been found to struggle with (Flory et al., 2006; Lorch, 
Deiner, et al., 1999; Lorch, Sanchez, et al., 1999; Renz, et al., 2003).  Consistent with 
these past findings (Lorch, Deiner, et al., 1999; Lorch, Sanchez, et al., 1999; Lorch, 
Eastham, et al., 2004), in the current study the recall of children with ADHD showed less 
sensitivity to causal structure and the importance level of events.  In addition children 
with ADHD performed more poorly on questions testing important factual information 
and on questions testing understanding of causal relations.  It is possible that one reason 
children with ADHD struggle with these aspects of story comprehension is because many 
connections and goals have to be inferred, because they are not always explicitly made 
during stories.  In the current study, causal inferences included only the implicit and not 
the explicit causal connections and goals of the stories, and children with ADHD 
generated fewer accurate coherence inferences that causally connected story events.  
Making fewer accurate coherence inferences may be a contributing factor to the broader 
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deficits in story comprehension.  In order to more thoroughly address the relationship 
between coherence inference deficits and story comprehension deficits (including 
memory for events, comprehension of causal relations, and sensitivity to the goal plan of 
stories) among children with ADHD, further testing should determine if there is a 
mediating relationship between the two deficits.  
The way that children with ADHD and comparison peers process a story and 
create inferences seems to be essentially different.  Children with ADHD seem to fail to 
realize that they need to infer causal connections, or they do not know how to use these 
connections to guide their recall.  Such problems are similar to those that are 
characteristic of poor comprehenders.  Analogous to the results of the current study, poor 
comprehenders make fewer connecting, or causal inferences than do skilled 
comprehenders (Cain & Oakhill, 1999; Laing & Kamhi, 2002).  As is the case for poor 
comprehenders without ADHD, it seems unlikely that children’s skills will improve 
without intervention.  Some story comprehension deficits observed in children with 
ADHD have been found to grow more severe as children develop (Bailey et al., 2009; 
Lorch et al., 2010), and this may be the case as well with the ability to generate coherence 
inferences.  In addition, medications commonly used to treat children with ADHD do not 
normalize story comprehension (Bailey, et al., 2011; Derefinko et al., 2009).  Research 
should now focus on how to prevent these deficits from becoming worse as children 
develop or to ameliorate these deficits.  Interventions can be tested that focus on teaching 
children how to develop skills needed to make appropriate inferences and use story 
structure to guide comprehension and recall.  
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The second purpose of this study was to determine if being asked to think aloud 
during formation of a story representation would affect children with ADHD differently 
from comparison peers.  Surprisingly, both groups seem to have been affected in the 
same way by the think-aloud and control conditions, as no significant interactions of 
group with condition were found for any recall measures.  Although no studies had 
previously tested to see if a think-aloud task would aid story recall among children with 
ADHD, van den Broek et al. (2001) found diminished comprehension during their think-
aloud protocol among typically developing younger children, approximately the same age 
as those who participated in the current study, when compared to older teenagers and 
adults abilities under the same circumstances.  A potentially critical difference is that the 
current study asked children to think aloud relatively infrequently during the story task, 
which allowed a greater number of story events to pass by between pauses.  In the current 
study, both groups benefited from the think-aloud experience; tending to perform better 
in the think-aloud condition than in the control condition on recall of events as a function 
of causal chain status and importance of events.  
Evidence that suggests that the think-aloud condition improves recall for children 
with ADHD is an important finding.  Whereas the effect of experiencing a think-aloud 
procedure does not normalize the recall of children with ADHD, both groups showed 
improved recall associated with the think-aloud procedure.  A modification of the think-
aloud task could potentially be used to help children with ADHD focus on and recall 
events that are significant to the story line.  Perhaps, the think-aloud procedure could be 
used as a context to further comprehension, by encouraging children to make connections 
and appropriate inferences during think-aloud pauses.  Children with ADHD (as well as 
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comparison peers) showed better recall in the current study without any guidance during 
pauses.  By building upon this encouraging result, it may be possible to correct erroneous 
thinking and to focus children’s thoughts on story themes and inferred causal 
connections.  If effective, children could be taught to use these strategies on their own to 
improve schoolwork.  Future research may empirically test whether guided think-aloud 
procedures can be used as a context for teaching strategies to improve comprehension.  
It also may be noted that for free recall, the order in which the children 
experienced the conditions had an effect.  Although there were no differential effects 
between the groups, both groups recalled a greater number of events when the think-
aloud condition occurred during the first session than if the control condition occurred 
first.  It is possible that experiencing the think-aloud condition first created performance 
expectations or suggested strategies that might be used during the second session.  Until 
such an effect is replicated, any interpretation should be made with caution.   
Limitations and future directions 
 There are several limitations to the current study.  One class of limitations 
concerns the sample of children that was selected.  Children with ADHD were recruited 
from previous studies, local psychiatric clinics, advertisements, and word of mouth.  
Children were all from the surrounding city.  This method of recruiting may have led to a 
sample that was not representative of the entire community of children with ADHD.  
Similarly, the comparison children were also recruited from previous studies, 
advertisements, and word of mouth.  For both groups, families who choose to participate 
in research may not reflect the general population.  A second sampling issue concerns 
whether diagnoses were accurate.  Although parents reported that a diagnosis had been 
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received, clinical records were not requested nor teacher interviews obtained for the 
children.  Although errors in diagnosis are possible, such errors are unlikely because 
diagnoses were confirmed with detailed parent interviews and well-known and reliable 
rating scales.  Finally, the sample size of the ADHD group was considerably smaller than 
the comparison group; thus it is possible that some tests did not have the necessary power 
to reach significance. 
A second limitation is that children, as a part of the larger study, experienced a 
second story on control days that required them to make predictive inferences.  If 
children experienced a control condition for Growing Pains on the first day and this 
predictive think-aloud task later in the same session, they may on the second day have 
been more likely to make predictive inferences.  We do not believe this was a problem, 
however, as no effects were found for predictive inferences based on session order.  
A third limitation is that the use of the think-aloud procedure requires pauses, 
which may be interruptions of story processing or opportunities for reflection.  Therefore, 
both the think-aloud condition and the control condition of the current study incorporated 
similar pauses.  However, it is unknown how story recall in the current study would 
compare with the same measures if children experienced no pauses during the stories, 
because including an additional condition without pauses was not feasible in the present 
investigation.  Similarly, both conditions allowed children to play with toys during the 
episode. Although, toys were present inorder to produce more natural variability in 
attention, it is unknown how children would have performed in each condition had 
viewing the televised at story been the only available task. 
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Finally, the scope of the current study is limited to the realm of story 
comprehension, which is a useful domain for gaining understanding of academic deficits.  
However, inference generation is not limited to narrative stories, but is relevant to other 
academic domains.  Causal relationships may have to be inferred in order to understand 
historical causes and effects.  In a science class, causes of phenomena may have to be 
inferred from scientific experiments.  Future research could investigate whether deficits 
that children with ADHD demonstrate in inference generation within narratives 
generalize to other subjects that children would frequently encounter in a classroom.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
The findings of this study have expanded understanding of the deficits that 
children with ADHD exhibit in their ability to understand stories.  While in the process of 
comprehending an ongoing story, relative to comparison peers, children with ADHD 
generated fewer of the most important type of inferences: accurate coherence inferences.  
Problems in cognitive engagement, inattention, executive function, and working memory 
are potential contributing factors to the group difference in inference making.  Generating 
fewer coherence inferences likely contributes to problems that children with ADHD 
experience in other domains of story comprehension.  Future research should focus on 
creating interventions that help children with ADHD create appropriate coherence 
inferences in order to improve story comprehension and recall. 
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Appendix A 
Plot summary of Growing Pains: 
Charity Begins at Home: (Birthday) 
The family children, Mike, Carol, and Ben, are seen dancing and talking on the phone 
when their father comes home. They quickly pretend to be doing chores and collect their 
allowance from their dad, which turns out to be twice the normal amount.  They all 
realize their father’s birthday is coming up.  Meanwhile the Mother pretends to have 
forgotten the birthday so as to make a party a surprise.  Mike and Carol argue about how 
much to spend on the birthday.  Ben realizes he does not have enough money for a big 
present, feeling that an ashtray he made school is not a good enough present.  Ben 
eventually prays for money, and thinks his pray is answered when a woman asking for 
money for the needy comes to the door.  He takes the money from her, then quickly has 
to return it.  Mike teases him and makes a sarcastic suggestion to go door to door asking 
for money.  Later at the surprise birthday party the father begins opening presents from 
each member.  When he opens Ben’s present, which turns out to be an expensive camera, 
the family begins asking him where he got the money.  Ben explains that he went door to 
door asking for money for charity, and he got the idea from God and Mike.  Both Mike 
and Ben are punished. Ben must return the camera and money.  Finally, while the father 
is putting Ben to bed, Ben apologizes and gives the father the ashtray he made.  The 
father explains it is the perfect present. 
 
Do You Believe in Magic?: (Magic) 
Mike is putting off doing his homework, and instead tries to go to the arcade with a 
friend, Boner.  He decides to get money from his brother and sister.  Mike offers to teach 
his younger brother Ben a card trick and cons him and Carol into betting $10.  Later after 
returning from the arcade, Ben and Carol subtly tell on Mike.  Mike gets in trouble both 
for tricking his siblings out of money and for not doing his homework.  The next day, 
Ben comes home is a rock he bought for $5 that he claims is magic, and apparently heals 
his mother’s tooth ache with this rock.  After the family dinner, Mike is told to clean is 
room, but Ben offers do clean it for a dollar with his magic rock.  It apparently works, 
and now Mike wants to buy the rock from Ben.  Meanwhile it turns out the mother and 
sister were hiding in the closet and had actually cleaned the room in secret.  Ben 
convinces Mike to pay $50 for the rock.  Mike tries to use the rock at school to get 
through a speech worth a large part of his grade, and realizes while in front of the class 
that he has been tricked.  Back at home, the parents realized how much Ben tricked Mike 
into paying for the rock, and Mike’s friend Boner comes over saying he too was tricked 
into buying the rock, for $60.  After the family repays Boner, he leaves, and turns out to 
be meeting Mike who he is working with in conspiracy.  Finally, Mike says Boner can 
keep the fake magic rock, Boner then tells him it is made out of a valuable material and 
Boner intends to sell.  Everyone learns, “If you con somebody, you’re gonna get hurt.”
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Appendix B 
 
Growing Pains Questions: 
Magic 
 
1. Explicit- At the beginning of the show, Mike is supposed to be studying. Then, his 
friend Boner calls. Why did Boner call Mike?  (To see if he wanted to go to 
the arcade) 
 
2. Explicit- Boner asks Mike to go to the arcade. Even though Mike knows Dad wouldn’t 
want him to go, Mike wants to go. Why is it still a problem for him?  (He’s 
broke) 
 
3. Inferred- Why does Ben walk by Mike and say “Not a chance?” (Mike wants money, or 
Mike is a con artist) 
 
 4. Factual- Mike tries to borrow money from Boner, Carol, and Ben, but no one wants to 
lend him money. What does Mike offer Ben to get Ben to lend him money? 
 (Offers to teach him a card trick) 
 
5. Inferred- Why do Ben and Carol decide to bet real money on the card trick?(Mike 
failed the card trick twice)  
 
6. Factual- After Ben and Carol bet real money, what happens when Mike tries the card 
trick again? (He gets it right, or he wins, or he gets their money) 
 
7. Inferred- After Carol tells Dad that Mike stole money from them, why does Ben ask 
Mike if he spent all the money at the arcade? (Trying to get Mike in trouble) 
 
8. Explicit- Why was Dad upset when he found out Mike was at the arcade playing video 
games? 
 (He was supposed to be working on his speech, studying, etc.) 
 
9. Explicit- Why was Dad mad at Mike when he found out how Mike got the money to 
go to the arcade? (He had conned Carol and Ben) 
 
10. Factual- Just after that, Ben tells Mom and Mike that he bought something for $5. 
What was it? (A magic rock) 
 
11. Inferred- Ben offered to clean Mike’s room for a dollar. What was another reason he 
offered to do this? (To convince Mike that the rock was really magic) 
 
12. Factual- After Mike leaves the room, Mom and Carol come out of Mike’s closet 
giggling. What are they carrying?(Garbage bags, Mike’s stuff, etc.) 
 
13. Inferred- Why did Mom and Carol come out of Mike’s closet? 
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 (They had cleaned the room and were hiding, or to convince Mike that the rock 
was really magic) 
 
14. Explicit- Why did Mike’s family decide to con him?(To teach him a lesson, or 
because he had conned Carol and Ben, or to get Carol and Ben’s money back) 
 
15. Inferred- Mike gets mad at Ben and lifts his hands to choke him. Why does Mike stop 
and call him a terrific kid instead?(He was mad at him, but realized that he 
needed Ben’s help) 
 
16. Explicit- Mike agrees to do Ben’s chores and to pay him $50 for the rock. Why does 
Mike want the magic rock? (To do his speech) 
  
17. Explicit- Why are Mom and Dad surprised when Ben comes home with a catcher’s 
mitt? 
 (They wonder where he got the money) 
 
18. Factual- That night, Boner comes over to the Seaver house and says he is angry and 
looking for Mike. What does he tell the Seavers that Mike did?(Sold him the 
magic rock) 
 
19. Inferred- Boner says he bought the magic rock from Mike and nearly killed himself 
on his skateboard. Why is he asking Mike’s parents for money? (Mike and 
Boner are conning Mike’s parents to get Mike’s money back, etc.) 
 
20. Inferred- When Boner says that the chemistry teacher has offered to pay him $200 for 
the rock, why does Mike say that isn’t fair? (Boner tricked Mike)  
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Appendix C 
 
Growing Pains Questions: Birthday 
 
1. Factual- After Dad comes in, he gives Mike, Carol, and Ben their allowance. What is 
unusual about the allowance he gives them? (It is double, or too much) 
 
2. Factual- What does Ben tell Mike and Carol that he’s giving Dad for his birthday?(An 
ashtray) 
 
3. Explicit- Why does Mike think the ashtray is a stupid present for Dad?(Dad doesn’t 
smoke) 
 
4. Inferred- When Mom asks Dad if they have plans for the weekend that she doesn’t 
know about, why doesn’t Dad tell her that it’s his birthday?(He wants her to 
remember on her own, it would spoil it if he had to tell her, etc.) 
 
5. Inferred- Why do Carol and Mike argue about how much to spend on Dad’s birthday 
present? 
 (Competing about looking good to Dad, trying to “one-up” each other, etc.) 
 
6. Inferred- When Mike and Carol are talking about how much money to spend on a 
birthday present for Dad, why does Carol make a sound like a chicken?(She’s 
saying he’s afraid to spend much on Dad’s gift) 
 
7. Inferred -Ben joins Mom and Dad in the kitchen and Dad asks Ben to tell Mom exactly 
what Saturday is. Why does Mom wink at Ben?(She knows it’s Dad’s birthday, 
but doesn’t want Ben to let on that he knows) 
 
8. Explicit- Mom tells Ben that she’d like to get Dad a Mercedes car but she can’t afford 
to, so she’s getting him a fishing rod. Why does she explain this to him? 
 (To show Ben it’s the thought that counts, not how much you spend) 
 
9. Explicit- Ben wants more money so that he can get Dad a nicer gift. He is watching TV 
and gets down on his knees to pray to God for money. Why did he decide to pray for the 
money? (He got the idea from a TV minister) 
 
10. Explicit- A the woman comes to the door collecting money for the needy and Ben 
takes the can. Why does Ben say that he took the can? (Because he’s needy too) 
 
11. Factual- Ben asks Mike what to do to get money. What does Mike tell him to do?(Go 
door to door asking) 
 
12. Explicit- Why was everybody surprised that Ben gave Dad a camera?(It’s expensive) 
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13. Inferred- When Ben said he got the money for the camera by collecting money for the 
needy, why does Mike look shocked and start to walk away? 
 (Because he knows he gave Ben the idea) 
 
14. Factual- When Mom asks Ben where he got the idea to collect money from the 
neighbors, Ben names two things. One is Mike. What is the other? (God) 
 
15. Inferred- As dad is questioning Ben about why he collected money from the 
neighbors, why does Ben remind Dad that the camera is self-winding and 
automatic focus? 
(To distract him from punishment, get his mind off of it, to make him want to keep 
the gift)  
 
16. Explicit- Ben suggests that his punishment should be going to bed at 9:00 every night 
for a week. Why does Dad say that can’t be his punishment?(That is already his 
bedtime) 
 
17. Factual- Ben has to return the camera. What else does he have to do as part of his 
punishment? 
 (Return the money to the neighbors and/or apologize) 
 
18. Inferred- Why does Mike bring Mom a cup of tea and a muffin? 
 (To placate her, so he won’t have to donate a month’s allowance) 
 
19. Explicit- Why does Dad say the ashtray is a good gift to use with some of his 
patients?(Because they’re trying to quit smoking) 
 
20. Inferred- The ashtray looks like a heart. Why would that help Dad’s patients stop 
smoking? 
 (It reminds them of their own heart, and smoking is bad for your heart)  
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Appendix D 
The Father, His Son, and Their Donkey (Before Experimental Condition ONLY) 
A father and his son were taking their donkey to town to sell him at the marketplace.  
They had not gone a great distance, when they met a group of pretty maidens who were 
returning from the town.  The young girls were talking and laughing when one of them 
cried out, “Look there.  Did you ever see such fools, to be walking along side the donkey 
when they might be riding it?” The father, when he heard this, told his son to get up on 
the donkey, and he continued to stroll along merrily.  The traveled a little further down 
the road, and soon came upon a group of old men talking.  “There,” said one of them, 
“that proves what I was saying.  What respect is shown to old age in these days? Do you 
see that idle young boy riding the donkey, while his father has to walk?” (Pause 1) 
“You should get down and let your father ride!” the old men said.  Upon this the son got 
down from the donkey and the father took his place.  They had not gone far when they 
happened upon a group of women and children.  “Why, you lazy old fellow, you should 
be ashamed.” cried several women at once.  “How can you ride upon the beast, when that 
poor little boy can hardly keep up with you?” So the good-natured father hoisted his son 
up behind him.  By now they had almost reached the town.  “Tell me friend,” said a 
townsman, “is that donkey your own?” “Why yes,” said the father.  “I would not have 
thought so,” said the other, “by the way you overwork him.  Why, you two are strong and 
are better able to carry the poor beast than he is to carry you.” (Pause 2) 
“Anything to please you, sir,” said the father, “we can only try.” So he and his son got 
down from the donkey.  They tied the animal’s legs together, and, taking a pole, tried to 
carry him on their shoulders over a bridge that led to the marketplace.  This was such an 
odd sight that crowds of people gathered around to see it, and to laugh at it.  The donkey 
did not like to be tied.  (Pause 3) 
So, the Donkey kicked so ferociously that he broke the rope, tumbled off the pole into the 
water, and scrambled away into the thicket.  With this, the father and his son hung down 
their heads and made their way home again, having learned that by trying to please 
everybody, they had pleased nobody, and lost their donkey, too.  
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